come down between the rivers. In either case all that can now be done will be to acquire all the knowledge that can be gained of the routes that will have to be traveled in the execution of either of these plans.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, June 28, 1864. (Received 7.10 p. m.)

General MEADE:

I have seen a Petersburg paper of the 27th, which says that Wilson was south of Burkeville about ten miles-on Friday I think it was. He had destroyed three trains, one loaded with cotton and furniture, the others with stores, &c. They seemed to anticipate his reaching their roads south of Danville and cutting Richmond off from the southwest for some time. I will go out in the morning. Will you meet me at Burnside's, say at 10 a. m.?

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 28, 1864-8 p. m.

Lieutenant-General GRANT:

Telegram received. I will be at Burnside's to-morrow by 10 a. m. Nothing new. All quiet. Men improving with the rest and charge of temperature.

GEO. G. MEADE,
Major-General.

MEMORANDUM.] HEADQUARTERS, City Point, June 28, 1864.

Our object in crossing the James is to take a position where our own communications can be easily maintained and from whence we can cut those of the enemy, compelling him either to attack us or to abandon any position he may take defending Richmond. I expected an obstinate defense of Petersburg in case we should not get entire possession of it before Lee could get his army there, and I hardly anticipated that. The failure of Butler to get that place or to accomplish anything with his formidable expedition, has been a sad drawback to the results of the campaign. Being as it is, the possession of Petersburg becomes a sine qua non, and it seems to me if we cannot cut Lee's communication from Petersburg to the south we cannot do it anywhere. Can the results aimed at be best accomplished by maintaining the entire army south of the Appomattox, or by crossing with a portion above or below Petersburg, or by forcing or turning the enemy's lines in front of Butler? We can probably force a passage of the Appomattox below Petersburg and above Swift Creek, or we can also do it above Petersburg; but as we cannot prevent Lee's crossing also by pontoon bridges at Petersburg I should regard either of these operations as too hazardous. As to acting from Butler's lines, if it should appear that an issue may be gained, it might be expedient, with a view of turning Longstreet's lines, and perhaps capturing a portion of his men and guns. It is the