depot of supplies. Some of the guns were removed from Fort McAllister and taken there preparatory to placing them in battery along our lines, and six 30-pounder Parrotts were brought down from Hilton Head for the same purpose. We were fast getting ready for another assault, which would this time have been made directly upon their main line, when, on the night of the 20th of December, the enemy, crossing the Savannah River on a bridge of flat-boats, made his escape, having abandoned a large number of guns and other material of war, and blown up his iron-clads. In this case, as in that of Atlanta, no attempt was made to make regular siege approaches. Our lines were thrust forward at all points to the edge of the water defenses of the enemy without any necessity for siege approaches, and beyond that it was useless to attempt anything of the kind. We could only get into the rebel lines by open assault, which was deemed quite practicable, particularly near the crossing of the Ogeechee road over Salt Marsh Creek, and in front of our batteries at Shaw's Bridge, over the Ogeechee Canal. I had closely reconnoitered the latter point and found that the natural obstacles were not very great, but the enemy's works were strongest here. Soon after our occupation of the city of Savannah, the major-General commanding directed me to select a new line, to be intrenched for the defense of such stores, depots, and material as we would leave there in future operations. in company with Captain Reese, I made a careful reconnaissance, and decided upon the location and character of the works. These were, in their main features, a system of large lunettes to be closed at the gorge and to be placed in defensive relations with each other, so that they might be held independently, but to be also connected by curtains of infantry parapet, so as to be used as a continuous line, if that was deemed desirable. The estimated garrison was 5,000 men. The location of the new lines was very nearly the same as those of 1814.

Before leaving Savannah on the campaign through the Carolina, by request of General Grover, who was left in command at Savannah, I handed him a paper, of which the following is a copy:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
CHIEF ENGINEER'S OFFICE,

Savannah, Ga., January 21, 1865.

Major-General GROVER,

Commanding U. S. Forces, Savannah:

GENERAL: In accordance with your request I have the honor of submitting the following memoranda, with reference to the defense of the city of Savannah:

First. The defense of the city itself: This is accomplished by the line of works now in process of construction, after the plain indicated in my letter to Major-General Sherman, dated December 26, 1864. These works are now ready to receive sixty guns, partly siege and partly field artillery, and in my opinion are in a condition which would warrant their defense by the garrison estimated for. Captain Suter, U. S. Engineers, and chief engineer Department of the South, has been furnished with a trace of this line, on which the several positions of the guns composing the complete armament are indicated. Captain Suter has also been furnished with those maps captured at this city which relate to the defense. Opposite the city, on the main Carolina shore, two small works should be built to command the Union causeway and the Huger causeway. The above contemplates an attack by a much larger force than the garrison, and, in my opinion, will never be made.

Second. The defense of the approaches: Three main roads lead into the city from inland, viz, the Ogeechee plank road (Darien road), the Louisville stage road, the Augusta stage road. The last two join within one miles and a half of the city. The points where stage road. The last two join within one mile and a half of the city. The points where the enemy's late lines crossed these roads furnish the best defense. When taken in conjunction with the obstacles formed by opening the sluice gates at high tide the positions are strong. If the bridge across the Ogeechee at King's is destroyed, it effectually cuts off direct approach by that road, and it can only be reached by