purpose of the other. If in our States there was that perfect understanding to which I have referred, and which I desire now tment, and the action of either in certain contingencies so deter mined that the occasion for action would be at the same time the knowledge of the kind of action which would be adopted, we should have that unity of purpose and conduct which would be to us of the greatest consequence.

Colonel Mullins, who bears you this, is possessed of all my views in relation to our present condition; and will in conference with you communicate without reserve. I shall be gald to hear through him (if your convenience permit) whatever you desire to say in relation to these matters of which I have written, and concerning wich he will speak with you. In the consideration of these resources which yet remain in the State, I am led-we are all necessarily led-to regard the past and present, as well as the probable future policy of the common government at Richmond. It is the present policy, that which now affects u, that which makes our future condition, that should now be earnestly considered. The opinion I have concerning the abandonment of our coast and cities and the attempted establishment of an interior line can be fully explained to you to by Colonel Mullins. It was an interior line which was broken when the enemy penetrated and threatened Savannah. Had Savannah been re-enforced and defended, the march which ended in its conquest would have resulted in disaster. There was, in fact, no interior nor exterior line of defense, and the result has been realized. That result now affects South Carolina and North Carolina, as well as Georgia. I need not stop to ask which will be the more bitter fate, the clemency promised to Georgia or the torture threatened to South Carolina. The success of the enemy consummates one great object, our conquered condition. That done, it matters little whether it is exhibited in gifts or chains. I deliberately repeat now to you my firm conviction that we have the means still left to us which will command our success if they are properly used, and if we agree as to their proper use, it will be well for us to consider whether it is not proper that in terms distinct but not offensive we should say so. I am satisfied, not from any doubtful source, but from conference with him, that no one if in command would more certainly or desperately engage the foe than General Johnston. The defeat of General Sherman he feels to be a great necessity which must be accomplished, and to its accomplishment he would give all in his power. Can he not be then restored? Will not the President listen to the deliberate opinion of these States, expressed through the Executive of each, urging it upon him as a matter of duty, because essential to the public good? Is it not proper that it should be attempted? Is it not our duty? I would be among the last to interfere with or attempt to control the action of the Government within its constitutional sphere, unless in cases like this, where delay was disaster, and acquiescence in what was wrong a crime in those who thought so, but would not say so.

Next to placing General Johnston again in command, I must bring to your attention the army of General Hood. What shall be done with that shattered band? Can its worn and thinned battalions be devoted to some purpose which, if achieved, will in some measure compensate us for the nd soldiers who have fallen in that campaign from which they are now retiring? Unable of itself to cope with the army of General Sherman, united with the resources we have left in these States, it would be more than equal to his overthrow. Consider this. Great as has been the success of General Sherman, it