is as decisive in the final results of this campaign to our foes if it should be unsuccessful, as it will be disastrous to us if successful. All the hopes of an ultimate triumph are now concentrated in the anticipation of his success. if that expectation should not be realized; if hopes so strons are defeated, the collapse will be overwhelming. The people of the United States will never rise from the overthrow. If, therefore, it seems as if our fortunes were clouded over by the host which is gathering around us, shall we not also see that in the dispersion of that host, which we can assuredly accomplish, our deliverance is secured. The co-operation of the army of General Hood with the forces now in this State would be sufficient for the overthrow of General Sherman, and this must be accomplished if it be possible. Is it possible? So far as this question relates to its practicability, there can be no doubt that it is a matter of easy accomplishment. So far as it relates to a consideration of its policy it seems to me very clear. General Sherman can now only be checked upon the soil of South Carolina. It is here he must advance to accomplish his purpose. To advance is to fight. It is here that his advance and it that the necessity for his fighting concur. And if he is here beaten, Georgia is redeemed by the same blow which delivers South Carolina. Is not, then, the concentration of a portion, at least, of General Hood's army in South Carolina a measure suggested by a plain consideration of the welfare of Georgia and South Carolina? How can it be done? General Beauregard is still the commander of the south and west. Would he not listen to the urgent request of these States, particularly if the same were enforced by the concurrence of Georgia? And if General Beauregard should be unwilling to assume the responsibility, would not the President recognize the force of the application thus addressed to him, from no captious purpose nor selfish motive, but because of those things which so intimately affect the public weal?

I have said enough, I hope, to show you that in the instances to which I have referred the co-operative action and common counsel of several States is not only wise in itself, but is now suggested by obvious considerations of necessity arising from the present condition of our public affairs. Nor is it in these particular cases only that this communion is wise and necessary. If at all times it may be so, at this time it must be so. We should think alike, feel alike, and act alike. The safety of all is in the safety of each. The strength of each should be that much of the strength of all, and thus sustained, the common Government of all, supported by the resources and the reserved powers of the States, acting within its proper sphere, would accomplish what we desired. It cannot nor should it be disguised from ourselves that the spirit of our people has become depressed. The reverses which have befallen us are more than suffiecient to have produced despondency. It is to be feared the policy of the common Government is soon to be exhibited in retiring from the coast line, evacuating our cities, and establishing what is called an interior line. This contraction of territorial limits, dispersion of population, and loss of material resources can never be the means by which we can recover what has been lost. Your line may be drawn, and you may be left to occupy it, and if you do without being driven from it the population it incloses will tire of that condition. They will not by it secure freedom, for the line will mark the limits-will determine their captivity. To regain what has been lost is at once to adopt the bold policy of losing no more. To lose no more is to destroy that army by which all has been lost. To destroy that army is not necessarily to diminish the Army of Virginia, but to