the President. General J. Expressed a cordial approval and gratification that I was willing to undertake the service, and a free conversation followed. This conversation developed distinctly the following points:

First. If General Sherman would attack General Johnston in his intrenchments it was all the latter would desire. The enemy, he thought, would be destroyed. As matters stood, General Johnston did not think such an attack would be made, though there were at times some such indications, as in the fight on the 27th of June.

Second. General Johnston was willing to fight Sherman out of his intrenchments, in open field, but this he could not do, as the latter would not advance except by intrenching as he advanced.

Third. General Johnston was not willing to attack the enemy in his intrenchments, and adopted the plan of falling back, when compelled by flank movement, rather than make such an attack.

Fourth. The enemy was enabled by his superior numbers, aided by the character of the country, to flank our army, and thus compel us slowly to fall back.

Fifth. General Johnston distinctly stated that the only way to get Sherman's army out of the country was by an attack in his rear - by cutting the railroad and destroying his supplies, &c. This, he thought, could be easily done. Five thousand cavalry, he thought, would be sufficient for his purpose. Such a force, he thought, in one day could destroy the railroad to such an extent as to require two weeks or a month to repair it, and this work should be done between Dalton and Marietta. His desire was that Forrest or Morgan, one or both, should be at once ordered to do this work. If such a force, for that purpose, were in Sherman's rear, the (Sherman) would be compelled to attack him (Johnston) in his intrenchments, or to retreat, in a bad condition, from the State. General J. understood there were 15,000 cavalry in Mississippi and Alabama under General S. D. Lee, and he would be satisfied if Forrest with one-third of that force were sent into Sherman's rear. I said: "General Johnston, all the supplies for your army come from Alabama, over the Atlanta and West Point Railroad. When you fall back so as to let the enemy rest on the river he will burn the bridge at West Point and cut off your supplies." General Johnston said he supposed that bridge was well fortified and defended. I said, "No; I am well informed there is not a spade of dirt amiss, not a pile driven, in the way of fortification, and the militia called there to defend it, I understood, had been sent home."

At this he expressed some surprise, and said if that road should be cut he would get his supplies from Opelika by way of Columbud and Macon. I said: "If they burn the bridge at West Point they can also burn the one at Columbus, only about thirty five miles farther down. Besides, I fear when you reach the river the enemy will cross below and force you to ross also, and that by continuing to flank you on the left they will finally pen you up in Atlanta, and the enemy's line will extend south of Atlanta, near East Point, and cover all the roads, and then not only Alabama, but Southern Georgia, whence General Lee gets his supplies, will all be in the rear and controlled by the enemy, and thus Richmond and the whole country will be captured." General Johnston replied: "Well, before the enemy shall get the position you mention of course we shall have a bloody fight," or words to this effect. This was the only point at which my mind received the impression that General Johnston would fight anyhow, or except under the condition previously mentioned. I said: "General Johnston, do you think Sherman can, or will, send our raiding parties?" He replied he could not