do it. I asked if he knew the number of Sherman's cavalry. He said Sherman had about 12,000 cavalry; that it was very inefficient, and would not fight our cavalry except with infantry support. I asked if he hadidence of the enemy's entire force. He said: "When we left Dalton, Sherman had 93,000 men. He had lost 25,000 or 30,000 in battle since that time. He had received re-enforcements, but not to the extent of his losses. Our losses had not been so great." "Then," I said, "you are more nearly on an equality with Sherman now than at Dalton?" He said he was. I asked General Johnston why he could not send out Wheeler's cavalry, or a portion of it, to do the work in Sherman's rear. He replied it was indispensable to the support of his army where it was; he could not do without it.

We then exchanged opinions freely as to the effects which would follow Sherman's defeat or success. I expressed to General Johnston with considerable earnestness my own conviction that if Sherman forced him back, even into Atlanta, and covered the country indicated, not only Altanta, but Richmond must fall; not only Georgia, but all the States would be destroyed; that Lincoln's power at the North would be absolute, his re-election certain, and the war for independence must be prolonged for years, and under the most disastroys circumstances. On the contrary, when Sherman is driven from Georgia we will recover Tennessee and Kentucky; Grant's army will leave Virginia; Lincoln's power will be broken, his re-election defeated by a straightout peace candidate, and we shall speedily end the war on our own terms. All, then, is lost by Sherman's success, and all is gained by Sherman's defeat. Then I added: "And I understand you to say, General Johnston, that Sherman cannot be defeated except by the proposed attack in his rear, and that this work must be done by Forrest or Morgan or by some such force?" This conclusion I repeacted three times, and said I felt the vital importance of the issue. everything hung upon it, and I would go at once to Richmond and do all in my power to have the order issued for the re-enforcements to the rear of Sherman. I then expressed some apprehension that there would not be time for its execution; that the time was certainly passing rapidly. General Johnston thought it might be done. General Hood thought the time was passing, if it had not already passed. We all agreed that no time was to be lost. I asked General Johnston how long it would require for the enemy to force him back to the Chattahoochee Rover. He said I could make the calculation; that the enemy had been so many days (over thirty) advancing from New Hope to the Chattachoochee River. He said I could make the calculation; that the enemy had been so many days (over thirty) advancing from New Hope to the Present position, only a few miles. General Hood said our present line was the strongest in that country; that the Kenesaw was the great military base in that region, and that when we left that line we should go back much more rapidly to the Chattahochee River. General Johnston admitted the strength of the present (Kenesaw) line, but said he had several strong lines between Marietta and the river, especially one at which be could annoy and hold the enemy a long time. Many other things were said incidental to the main points. General Johnston expressed his gratification that I had determined to visit Richmond on the subject, and we parted. Of subsequent events you are apprised. Of the availability of the force under Forrest and Morgan to do the work indicated you are the better judge. Of the sufficiently of the force already with General Johnston to do the work indicated you can determine. Of your will to do promptly whatever can be done, I am pleased to be most fully aware. I shall remain in the