August 31 the corps was moved in the direction of Rough and Ready by way of Thorn's Mill. General Newton was instructed to remain in position until he should be joined by General Schofield's force, and then to follow. Arriving in sight of the mills on Crooked Creek, on the Decatur road, a long line of breast-works could be seen on the opposite side of the creek. These were occupied, but in what force we could not at once determine. Kimball's and Wood's divisions were deployed, and pushing forward a strong line of skirmishers, the enemy, who proved to be dismounted cavalry, abandoned the works and took to their heels. Verbal instructions having been received to push a strong reconnaissance to the railroad southeast of Rough and Ready in conjunction with General Schofield, Newton's division was put in position covering the direct road to Jonesborough, and protecting the artillery and trains, and Wood's and Kimball's divisions were pushed forward to the railroad. As the Twenty-third Army Corps occupied the main road leading to the railroad, we had to explore roads leading farther south and as nearly parallel as possible. Owing to delays occasioned by searching for roads, and the brushy nature of the country, we did not arrive on the railroad until about 4 p. m., and just a few moments after General Cox's division, of the Twenty-third Army Corps. A small break was made in the road, but deeming a secure lodgment the most important thing, the troops were formed in line facing Jonesborough, and forming with the Twenty-third Corps a V, with the apex resting east of the road. The troops were strongly barricaded in this position, and a strong force, including all the pioneers of the corps, was ordered to commence breaking up the road at 3 o'clock in the morning. General Schofield sent me copy of his instructions from district [division] headquarters, and proposed that Cox's division should go back on the road in the direction of Rough and Ready, assisting Garrard to break up the road, and that I should move on in the direction of Jonesborough, breaking the road, and that he would follow with his corps and make the works complete. In answer to this, I objected to his plan of separating forces, not knowing the position of the enemy, but informed him that I should undoubtedly receive instructions from department headquarters. At 10 o'clock in the evening I received instructions from department headquarters directing me to move early toward Jonesborough, destroying the road, and apprising me that I would probably overtake Baird's division similarly employed, and if I found Baird to report for further instructions. At daylight the corps was put in motion, Kimball's and Newton's divisions down the railroad, Wood's division on the Rough and Ready and Griffin road in charge of the extra artillery and baggage. In starting out in the morning I passed General Schofield's headquarters. In conversation he asked me if I ranked him; I told him I did. He then said if a battle occurred he would be under my command. I said to him that there was little likelihood of any battle until reaching Jonesborough, and that our common superiors would probably be near at hand. No intimation from any quarter was given me that General Schofield was under my command, nor did I so consider him. I had no right to command him unless so instructed from competent authority. At 10 a. m. the head of the corps arrived at the point struck by General Baird's division the day before. My chief of staff, Colonel Fullerton, was at once sent to General Thomas for instructions. At 12.15 Fullerton returned, saying that General Thomas had sent Wood's division to join the corps and that as soon as Wood had joined and I was ready