to advance I should inform the department headquarters. Major Sinclair, assistant adjutant-general, having also returned from General Thomas with instructions to keep down on the flank of General Davis, Fourteenth Corps, the troops were moved the railroad, the head of the column abreast with the advance of the Fourteenth Corps. Colonel Fullerton brought a message from General Thomas about 4 p.m . to push on down the railroad toward Jonesborough. This was done. The pickets of the enemy were struck about 4 p. m. Kirby's and Grose's brigades, of Kimball's division, were deployed and instructed to push the enemy vigorously. Newton's division was also deployed on the left of Kimball's and urged to push forward as rapidly as possible. It was past 5 o'clock when Kirby's and Grose's brigades got up in the face of the enemy. This delay, which was fatal to our success, was in part owing to the very dense nature of the undergrowth in front of the enemy's position, and further, to the slow progress the skirmishers made in pushing back those of the enemy. General Grose and Colonel Kirby both reported they could not carry the position in their fronts owing to the perfect entanglement made by cutting down the thick undergrowth in front of the rail barricade the rebels had hastily thrown up. Newton's division had a much longer circuit to make, and, when moved forward, the right brigade (Wagner's) found no enemy in front but received a fire from the rear of their right flank. The flank of the enemy had been found and turned, but it was now pitch dark and nothing more could be done. Very early in the night the enemy retreated. The formation and advance of the troops of Kimball's and Newton's divisions was done under a severe cannonade, and, although the men were perfectly cool and behaved well, I have no doubt but this delayed the deployment. Just before dark General Davis sent me word that he had positive information that we were on their flank, which was the [first] intimation I had of the position of the enemy. No one regrets more than myself the escape of Hardee's corps, and it is easy after the facts are revealed to see how he might have been caught; but the position of the enemy was entirely unknown to me and had to be developed, and the time necessary to overcome the difficulties brought us to night,and with night the opportunity for the enemy to escape. I carried out all orders and instructions received without delay, and when the enemy was found used all the personal exertions in my power to push the troops rapidly forward. I believed the subordinate commanders put their troops in position and advanced them to the best of their ability and understanding. That we did not succeed was simply because the daylight was not an hour longer. Wood's division was kept in reserve as the Twenty-third Corps was not closed up upon the Fourth, and I had no knowledge of what I might expect form the enemy upon my left flank. The loss, principally in Kimball's division, was about 100 men killed and wounded. We captured 137 prisoners, including 7 commissioned officers.

Early on the morning of the 2nd of September the enemy was found to have retreated. About 9 o'clock the corps was started in pursuit, under instructions from General Sherman to keep down the east side of the railroad, leaving the roads on the right for the Army of the Tennessee. We marched upon the McDonough road and cross-country roads, three miles south of Jonesborough, when, finding that we could find a road for artillery alongside the railroad, this route was followed. At 12 m. the enemy was found in position briskly fortifying across the road and railroad, about one mile north of Lovejoy's Station. Arrangements were made at once for advancing upon