of the bridges, in minimum garrisons, with the cavalry and Indians of the brigade for scouts and police of roads.

2nd. The remaining infantry force, numbering about 6,000 effective, is organized into three brigades. From this force a small garrison, sufficient to guard against surprise, has been kept at Cumberland Gap. The rest, under instructions from General Johnston, has been on or near the line of railway, with a view to speedy concentration. It will be concentrated, in as large bodies as practicable, at Morristown, to support Cumberland Gap at Clinton, with a view to concentration toward the front, either to meet an enemy from the direction of Somerset, Ky., or Cumberland Gap; and at Loudon and Knoxville to cover depots prior to a general concentration.

3rd. My cavalry force, though nominally somewhat larger, has in reality not more than 3,000 effective. They are organized into two brigades. General Pegram, with this force, is at Monticello, Ky., acting in concert with General Morgan, who has in the same vicinity, detached from General Bragg's army, about 3,000 cavalry. The rest of my cavalry force observes the front from Big Creek Gap and Cumberland Gap in the direction of Baroursville, Ky., and from Kingston in the direction of Sparta, Ten., as far as Crossville. A portion of this cavalry is held as reserve.

4th. Preston's (late Marshall's) brigade is in Southwestern Virginia and Southeastern Kentucky. It numbers (exclusive of the Fifty-fourth Virginia Regiment and a Georgia battalion which I found here, and which are included in the foregoing estimate of infantry) little more than 2,000 effective man of all arms. Fully half of this force are cavalry. The troops of that brigade are generally imperfectly organized, and many of them nomadic in their habits. They are chiefly mountaineers, intimately acquainted with the passes, and in their peculiar way are doubtless very useful.

5th. But few of the troops have ever been in action; most of them have been on marches and encountered hardships, but, owing to their having been long dispersed in small bodies, their instruction and discipline are not good. These faults I am attempting to remedy.

6th. After leaving a garrison at Cumberland Gap large enough to hold it against a surprise, together with other necessary guards, I could not at this time concentrate at any decisive point for action more than 4,000 effective infantry and 2,000 cavalry, with proportionate artillery. This is inclusive of Preston's brigade, which is so remote, and in so disorganized a condition, that I could not reasonably expect any portion of it to combine with me, except, perhaps, a small part of it, which might in an emergency be brought to Cumberland Gap.

7th. The forage in the mountains of Kentucky is exhausted completely; there is little or no grass. The transportation is in bad condition; forage and provisions must be transported from the railroad to the mountains for supplying animals and men. Powell's Valley, in the rear of the Cumberland Range, is denuded, and, like the country in the mountains, is almost a desert. The valley of the Clinch, next to Powell's Valley, furnishes but little grass and no corn. Under these difficulties, which you will appreciate, I have been compelled to adopt the following general policy:

I keep my infantry and part of my cavalry this side the mountains, within supplying distance of the railroad, and in position to sustain the mountain passes in front. I keep as heavy scouts as practicable in the mountains. In the mean time I urge forward supplies of provisions and forage as rapidly as transportation will admit to Pound Gap, Cum-